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VIRGINIA SECTION
THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF VIRGINIA LAvV

CONTRACTS AND SALES
Joseph Curtis*
RELEVANT LEGISLATION

The Uniform Commercial Code, which was enacted in the 1964 legislative session and which became effective in Virginia on January 1, 1966,
provided enough changes in the substantive law of contracts and sales
to occupy the Virginia bar for a long time to come. The General Assembly may well have been conscious of this in promulgating few substantive
enactments in this area in the 1966 regular session.
The bulk of the statutory provisions emanating from this session were
directed at conforming previously existing Code sections \vith the new
Uniform Commercial Code. Thus Code section 11-1, declaring certain
oral contracts void as to creditors and purchasers, was amended to provide that if the contract or bill of sale creates a security interest as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, its validity should be governed
by the UCC.1 Similarly, the validity of certain recorded contracts as
against creditors and purchasers, which had been governed by Code
section 55-95 is now to be controlled by the pertinent UCC sections if
the contract creates a security interest as contemplated by the UCC. 2
Numerous other such amendments were made to give decisive effect
to the UCC provisions where they might otherwise conflict with preUCC applications of the older Code sections.3
Also worthy of note is new Code section 11-20.14 which permits a
preference to be accorded to a resident bidder on a public contract when
the home state laws of a lower nonresident bidder would allow such
a preference to its residents.
CoNTRAcrs
Broker's Right to Commission for Unconsummated Sale
In Reiber v. ]ames M. Duncan, ]r. & Associates> the Supreme Court
"Dean and Professor of Jurisprudence, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College
of William & Mary. B.S., 1934, LL.B., 1937, LLM., 1948, New York University.
1 VA. CoDE ANN.§ 11-1 (Supp.l966).
2 VA. CoDE ANN. § 55-95 (Supp. 1966).
3 See, e.g., VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 8.9-302 & 55-96 (Supp. 1966).
4 VA. CoDE ANN.§ 11-20.1 (Supp. 1966).
5206Va.657, 145 S.E.2d 157 (1965).
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of Appeals applied the general rule that a broker is entitled to his commission upon procuring a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy a
listed property on the owner's terms even though the sale is not consummated, unless the failure of the transaction is the fault of the broker.
The Court held the rule controlling notwithstanding ( 1) that the defendant's wife, whose signature was necessary to convey the absolute
title to the property, had not joined in either the listing agreement or
the contract of sale, since the defendant was indebted to the agent for
personal services rendered regardless of his interest in the property; (2)
that there was a delay in settlement, since time was not of essence in
the contract; (3) that the sale was contingent upon inspections of the
property by the purchasers and the city inspector, since the contingency
was wholly for the benefit of the purchasers and the evidence indicated
either that the inspections had been made or that the purchasers had
waived their right thereto; and (4) that no tender of payment had been
made by the purchasers, since the defendant had already made it known
before the settlement date had been fixed that he was not going to consummate the sale.

Commission Denied Because of Agent's Conflict of Interest
An agent authorized to sell may not sell to himself, except with full
knowledge and consent of his principal, regardless whether the agent
pays the price fixed by the principal or as much or more than anyone
else would pay. 6 In Bell v. Routh Robbins Real Estate Corp.,7 an action
by the seller to recover the commission paid to the agent, the trial court
found that although there were many respects in which the agent was
closely associated with the purchaser, there was no breach of his duty
to the seller since none of the ties between the agent and the purchaser
gave the agent an interest in the subject property or an ownership
interest in the buyer corporation. The Supreme Court of Appeals, reversing and rendering final judgment for the plaintiff seller, held that the
agent's duty of loyalty to the seller-principal demanded more than a
mere absence a concealed ownership interest in the buying entity. In
Bell the subagent, who was acting in the transaction for the agent real
estate corporation, was one of the signatories to the buyer's articles of
incorporation, had participated in the initial incorporation meeting and
in the election of the buyer's directors, was elected a director and vicepresident of the buyer, and could expect to earn a subsequent commission upon resale of the property by the buyer.8 The nondisclosure of
6See MECHEM, AGENCY§§ 504-07 (4th ed. 1952).
206 Va. 853, 147 SE.2d 277 (1966).
s Although the defendant real estate corporation had no knowledge of its subagent's
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the agent's substantial interest in the consummation of the sale to the
buyer corporation was in the Court's view as much a breach of the
agent's fiduciary duty to the seller as his nondisclosure of a personal
ownership interest in the buyer corporation would have been.

Contract Voidable When Agent Acts for Both Parties
Without Thei1· Knowledge
In P1·ice v. Martin 9 a vendor sued for a declaratory judgment to void
a contract of sale of real property and to enjoin the purchaser from
asserting any rights thereunder. The agent involved in the case had, at
the request of a prospective purchaser on a previous occasion, asked the
plaintiff if she was interested in selling certain property. Although the
plaintiff expressed an interest in selling this property, the price offered
was apparently too low, and no sale was accomplished as the result of
this conversation. Moreover, the plaintiff declined the agent's invitation
to place her property on his list. Subsequently, the defendant contacted
the agent about the possibility of purchasing the plaintiff's property, and
the agent obtained the plaintiff's agreement to sell the property to the
purchaser at a price satisfactory to both parties. This agreement was made
subject to a condition, attached by the plaintiff, that a third party was to
have the right of first refusal, but the printed sales contract did not recite
this condition, nor did the agent inform the defendant of it when he presented the contract for the defendant's signature. When the third party
accepted the plaintiff's offer, the question of the defendant's rights in the
property arose, and the declaratory judgment action was instituted.
The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment entered in favor
of the plaintiff vendor. The apparent ground for the decision was that
although the defendant had no actual knowledge of the condition to
the sale, the knowledge of the real estate broker, who unquestionably
was the defendant's agent, was imputed to the defendant. However,
the decision is not entirely clear and contains language which seems to
suggest an alternative holding that the contract of sale was voidable because the real estate broker was acting as the agent of both parties without
their intelligent consent. It appears from the statement of facts that the
Court justifiably found that the broker did become the agent of the vendor
as well as of the purchaser during the course of the transaction, because the
printed provision of the sales contract stated that the purchaser should make
the down payment to the broker as the agent for the vendor and because
connections with the buyer-corporation, the Coutt said that under familiar agency principles the defendant's right to retain the commission could rise no higher than the right
of its subagent, who was acting within the scope of his employment. Id. at 861, 147
S.E.2d at 282.
9 207 Va. 86, 147 S.E.2d 716 (1966).
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the vendor agreed to pay the broker his commission. However, it also
appears that both parties were quite aware that the broker was acting as
the agent for both parties. Thus it is submitted that the firmer ground
for the Court's decision is that the agent's knowledge of the condition
to the sales contract should be imputed to the defendant as one of the
agent's principals.

Ambiguity Resolved Against One Who Creates It
The question presented in Graham v. Commonwealth 10 was whether
the plaintiff contractor was entitled to immediate payment of fifteen
dollars per cubic yard for certain extra excavation work which it performed, or whether the amount of payment was still open to negotiation
between the parties. Several different parts of the contract, which were
in apparent conflict, were relevant to this issue. The specifications provided that "any additional excavation and fill will be paid for in accordance with unit prices agreed upon." Seemingly the prices referred to in
this clause were set in the "Form of Agreement," which stated that the unit
price for any change in the work was to be fifteen dollars per cubic
yard. However, the "General Conditions" provided that the defendant
should have a choice between three methods of paying the plaintiff for
extra work. The second method set forth was to estimate "the number
of unit quantities" and to multiply this number "by the applicable unit
price (if any) set forth in the contract or other mutually agreed unit
price." The defendant contended, and the lower court held, that this
provision in the General Conditions section was not inconsistent with the
specifications clause and the Form of Agreement, and that the price set
in the Form of Agreement was merely one method of payment which
the defendant could follow at its option. Support for this position was
drawn from the fact that the General Conditions provision mentioned
not only a "unit price ... set forth in the contract," which presumably
referred to the price set forth in the Form of Agreement, but also an
"other mutually agreed unit price." Thus it was argued that the defendant was free to choose under the contract to pay either the fifteen
dollars per cubic yard or to negotiate a new price. The defendant sought
to reconcile this interpretation '\vith the specifications clause by arguing
that that clause should be read to mean "unit prices [to be] agreed upon."
The Supreme Court of Appeals did not accept this reasoning, but concluded
that the language of the specifications clause was clear and that its
plain meaning should not be changed by inserting the words "to be" as
the defendant urged. Thus the Court held that the specifications clause
referred to the price set forth in the Form of Agreement and that the
1o 206 Va. 431, 143 S.E.2d 831 (196;).
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plaintiff was entitled to a payment based upon this figure. Supporting
the Court's position was a provision in the contract which stated that in
the event of conflict the specifications clause should take precedence over
the General Conditions, and the Form of Agreement should take precedence over both the specifications clause and the General Conditions.
Moreover, the Court relied upon the proposition that an ambiguity in
a contract is to be strictly construed against the party who wrote the
contract.
Tlus latter principle was also applied by the Court in Hutchison v.
King.U The issue presented in that case was whether the obligation of a
subcontractor was to place sod "to the satisfaction of the Contracting
Officer," or whether the work had to be "accepted by the Engineers [for
payment by the Federal Aviation Agency]." If the former interpretation
were to prevail, since the sod had been placed with approval of the
contracting officer, the subcontractor-plaintiff would not be responsible
for subsequent maintenance and the washing away of the sod in later
storms. However, if the subcontractor's work had to be accepted in the
same manner as for payment by the Agency, the loss of the sod in the
wash of the storms would have to be borne by the plaintiff since that
condition had not been met. The lower court gave to the defendant's
letter confirnling the oral agreement the latter construction and entered
judgment for the defendant. In reversing and rendering final judgment
for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Appeals could find no justification
for implying the bracketed term, and furthermore noted that even if the
provisions were ambiguous, they must be construed against the defendant,
who wrote the confirming letter. Also of note is the Court's holding that
it was not bound by the trial judge's interpretation of the intent of the
confirnling letter.

Effect of a Seal on Revocability
In Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Cox12 the Supreme Court of Appeals
was presented with the question whether a seal is sufficient, in the
absence of any other consideration, to preclude the revocation of an
offer. In this case the lessor executed under seal an indenture lease agreement. The agreement was then given to an agent of the lessee for
processing and, if it was approved, the signature of the lessee. However,
before he signed the instrument, the lessee was informed by the lessor
that the offer was cancelled. The lessee nevertheless signed the lease
agreement and sought to hold the lessor to its terms, alleging that since
the offer was executed under seal it was an irrevocable option. The
11206 Va. 619, 145 S.E.2d 216 (1965).
207 Va. 197, 148 S.E.2d 756 (1966).

12
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Supreme Court of Appeals aclmowledged that in Watkins v. Robertson13
it had held that an offer was made binding by the mere presence of a
seal. However, the Court distinguished Watkins from the case before it
on the ground that whereas the instrument in Watkins had been intended
to operate as an option, the one which it was presently considering was
intended to be a bilateral contract imposing mutual rights and obligations. Thus, the Court reasoned, the rule that an option is made irrevocable by a seal was not applicable since it was not an option contract
which was in issue. The Court pointed out that to hold that the lessor was
precluded from revoking his offer because he signed the lease agreement
under seal would be "to enforce an implied promise that was never
intended by giving to a seal an effect that was never intended." 14
Accordingly, the Court held that the lessor had justifiably cancelled his
offer before it had been accepted, and that he was therefore not bound
by the lease agreement.

Liability on Contractor's Payment Bond
Noland Co. v. West End Realty Corp. 15 involved the question whether
a contractor and its surety were liable on their bond to the plaintiff for
payment for materials which the la~er had supplied to a subcontractor.
The contractor had previously paid the subcontractor in full, but the
subcontractor was adjudicated bankrupt before the plaintiff collected
from him. The plaintiff cited to the Court cases in which it was held
that liability on a bond is not extinguished by the fact that the general
contractor has paid to the subcontractor the full subcontract price. These
cases were not themselves dispositive, however, since, as the defendants
contended, they were distinguishable on the ground that in the instant
case the defendant-contractor had paid to his subcontractors, who were
within the class of persons who could be claimants under the bond,
a total in excess of the amount of the bond. The Court aclmowledged
that the defendants' liability on the bond could be no greater than the
sum of the bond. Thus the question was narrowed to whether the defendants' liability on the bond was extinguished simply by payment to
potential claimants under the bond of an amount in excess of the sum
of the bond or whether their liability on the bond could be extinguished
only by payment of claims actually made pursuant to the bond. In
holding that the defendants' liability had not been extinguished, the
Court followed the general rule that an obligation on a bond is independent of the contractor's liability to his subcontractors, because it is
13105 Va. 269, 54 S.E. 33 (1906).
14 207 Va. at 202, 148 SE.2d at 760.
15 206 Va. 938, 147 S.E.2d 105 (1966).
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derived from the contract between the contractor, the surety and the
owner of the project, and not from the subcontract itself. The Court
found crucial for its decision a provision in the bond which stated that
"payment by Surety of mechanics' liens . . . , whether or not claim for
the amount of such lien be presented under and against this bond"
would reduce the amount of the bond. The Court reasoned that the
singling out of the payment of mechanics' liens in this manner clearly implied that payment of claims other than mechanics' liens would reduce the
amount of the bond only if the claims were :filed against the bond.
SALES

Processor's Implied Warranty Not Terminated by the Fact
That Retailer Has Opened Package
The landmark 1959 case of Swift & Co. v. W ells16 linked Virginia
\vith the increasing number of jurisdictions which have eliminated the
requirement of privity in a consumer's action for breach of an implied
warranty of :fitness for human consumption against a remote seller of
foodstuffs. In Brockett v. Harrell Bros.,U decided during the past term,
the Supreme Court of Appeals was confronted \vith a situation which was
distinguishable from Swift on the ground that the defective product had
not been sold in a sealed package, but had been handled direcdy by the
retailer before being sold to the plaintiff. The Court recognized that in
an action against a remote seller or the manufacturer the plaintiff might
have more difficulty in proving that the goods were defective before
being placed in the hands of the retailer if the retailer has opened the
package than if the package has remained sealed. However, the Court
held that the trial court had erred in striking the plaintiff's evidence relating
to the implied warranty of a remote seller, because the question whether
the goods were defective when they left the hands of this seller was one
for the jury. It is to be noted that the Court was not required to extend
the doctrine of Swift in making its decision since in 1962 the General
Assembly enacted a statute which eliminated lack of privity as a defense
in all actions for breach of warranty.18
In Brockett the Court also discussed the question whether contributory negligence is a defense to an action for breach of warranty. Acknowledging the conflict of authority on this issue, the Court stated that
since a warranty action is ex contractu, the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff is not material. However, the Court took care to note that
201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959).
Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d 897 (1965).
18 See VA. ConE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965).
16

17 206
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"if the condition of the ham of which the plaintiff complains was known,
visible or obvious to her, there was no liability on an implied warranty
of fitness . . .." 19 This language appears to suggest that assumption of
risk can be a defense to a warranty action. On the other hand, the Court
seemed to limit the availability of assumption of risk as a defense by
rationalizing the doctrine in contract terms. Thus the Court stated that
the reason that the plaintiff could not recover for breach of warranty if
she had known of the existence of the defect was that "the presumption
is that the plaintiff contracted to buy this food product in its obvious
or known condition." 20 If this is in fact the rationale of the rule, it
would appear that the defense could not be invoked in the situation
where an injured consumer has bought a defective product concealed in
a closed package and later, before using the product, discovers the defect. Although such a result would preserve the conceptual integrity
of a warranty action as ex contractu, it would seem to be otherwise unjustifiable.

RestaurateU1· Sells Food With Implied Warranty
Another case decided this term involving the implied warranty of
fitness in the sale of foods was Levy v. Paul.21 The only question before
the Supreme Court of Appeals in that case was whether a restaurateur is
deemed to "sell" food for the purpose of determining whether he impliedly warrants its fitness for human consumption. A substantial minority of jurisdictions have held that a restaurant proprietor only utters food
and that no warranty attaches since the transaction with the consumer
does not constitute a sale. 22 There was some reason to believe that
Virginia would align itself with this minority in view of the holding of
the Supreme Court of Appeals in O'Connor v. Smith23 that a restaurateur
does not buy and sell merchandise so as to come within the scope of
the Bulk Sales Act.24 However, the Court held in the instant case that
whatever might be the status of the restaurant business for purposes
of the Bulk Sales Act, 25 there is no good reason to hold that the serving
of food and drink by a restaurateur is not a sale for purposes of the
19 206 Va. at 463, 143 SE.2d at 902.
2o Ibid.
21201 Va. 100, 147 S.E.2d 722 (1966).
22See, e.g., Nisky v. Childs Co., 103 N.J.L. 464, 135 Atl. 805 (Ct. Err. & App.
1927); Walton v. Guthrie, 50 Tenn. App. 383, 362 S.W.2d 41 (1962).
23188 Va. 214, 49 SE.2d 310 (1948).
24 Va. Code Ann. § 55-83 (1959). This statute was repealed as of January 1, 1966,
and replaced by the UCC provisions on bulk transfers. See VA. ConE ANN. §§ 8.6101 to -111 (1965).
25 It is to be noted that the restaurant business is still excluded from the
coverage of the bulk transfer law. See VA. ConE ANN. § 8.6-102, comment 2 (1965).
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law of warranty. Accordingly, it reversed the lower court which had
sustained the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff consumer's motion for
judgment. It is to be noted that the question raised by Levy is moot as
to any transaction arising after January 1, 1966, the effective date in
Virginia of the Uniform Commercial Code, which expressly brings within
the scope of the implied warranty of merchantability "the serving for
value of food or drink to be consumed . . . on the premises. . . ." 26

Proof of Damages on Breach of Implied Warranty
Still another aspect of the law of implied warranties of quality in
sales transactions was considered by the Supreme Court of Appeals in
Holz v. Coates Motor Co. 21 This case involved the plaintiff's burden
to establish his damages in a warranty action. It was not disputed that
the measure of damages was the difference between the value of the
goods sold with and >vithout the defect warranted against. The Court
stated that the sales price of the product in question could be taken as
the value of the product >vithout defects, but that there must be some
evidence submitted as to the value of the product >vith its alleged defects. 28
Since the plaintiff had submitted no such evidence, the Court affirmed
the trial court's action in setting aside the jury's verdict against the manufacturer. In dictum, however, the Court noted that the plaintiff could
have avoided this burden of proof by electing the alternative remedy of
rescission.

State Statute Gives Federal Court a "Long-Arm"
In Etzler v. Dille & McGuire Manufacturing Co.29 a federal district court
upheld the paragraph of Virginia's "long-arm" statute30 encompassing actions for breach of warranty. The court first found that the personal
jurisdiction conferred by the statute extended to the federal courts. It
then held that the application of the statute does not deny the defendant
due process of law, even when it is applied retroactively to cover a
cause of action which arose before the statute became effective.
Regarding the federal jurisdiction question, whatever conflict there may
once have been regarding the use by a federal court of a state long-arm
26 VA. CODE ANN.§ 8.2-314(1) (1965).
27206 Va. 894,147 S.E.2d 152 (1966).
28 The plaintiff attempted to prove that the defect was such as to render the
automobile in question totally valueless in order to bring his case within the ambit
of such cases as Gerder v. Bowling, 202 Va. 213, 116 S.E.2d 268 (1960). The Court,
however, discredited the plaintiff's statement that the car was valueless in light of the
fact that it had been driven more than 8,000 miles within twelve months.
29 249 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Va. 1965).
30 VA. CoDE ANN. § 8-81.2 (5) (Supp. 1966).
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statute is now resolved by new federal rule 4(e),31 which expressly
authorizes service of federal process in the manner prescribed by a state
statute directed at service on nonresidents. On the issue of constitutionality, the court found that the Virginia provision relating to breach
of warranty, which provides for service on a defendant who has engaged
"regularly" in "persistent" conduct within the state, was similar in scope
to the Washington statute which was upheld by the Supreme Court of
the United States in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. 32 Moreover, the
court pointed out that there is strong indication that the Supreme Court
would uphold the constitutionality of a "single-act" provision in a longarm statute,33 which leads a fortiori to the conclusion that Virginia's
breach of warranty provision is valid. The retroactive application of
the statute raised a more serious constitutional problem, but the court
held that since the Virginia statute was intended to be procedural
and since a party has no vested rights in matters of procedure, such
application of the statute was not unconstitutional. However, the court
stated that there was a "substantial ground for difference of opinion" on
this issue, and therefore granted the defendant a right to an immediate
appeal from the order denying his motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.

c.v. P. 4(e).
u.s. 310 (1945).

31

FED. R.

32

326

33 249 F. Supp. at 5. In support of this statement the court cited Rosenblatt v.
American Cyanamid Co., 86 Sup. Ct. 1 (Goldberg, Circuit Justice, 1965), in which
an application for a stay of judgment pending appeal from a decision of the New
York Court of Appeals sustaining the trial court's denial of the defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction was denied.
In that case Mr. Justice Goldberg concluded that the defendant's argument against
the constitutionality of a provision in New York's long-arm statute conferring
jurisdiction on the basis of the commission of a tortious act was insubstantial.

